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IN IMPARTIALITY WE TRUST:
A COMMENTARY ON GOVERNMENT AID
AND INVOLVEMENT WITH RELIGION
THOMAS J. CLEARY*
[S]ay nothing of my religion. It is known to my
God and myself alone. Its evidence before the
world is to be sought in my life; if that has been
honest and dutiful to society, the religion which
has regulated it cannot be a bad one.1
-Thomas Jefferson
I.

INTRODUCTION

G

overnment neutrality towards religion was not intended
by the Framers of the U.S. Constitution, is not mandated by
the First Amendment, and, strictly speaking, is not possible.
Despite this, there has been a significant trend in the law
towards establishing “neutrality” as the benchmark for proper
government interaction with religion. In fact, many view the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment [hereinafter “Religion Clauses”] as erecting an
impenetrable wall that separates government and religion.
This is incorrect, however, as the Religion Clauses stipulate
only that, “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.”2 Notably, the wall metaphor and the neutrality ideal
*

Thomas J. Cleary is an Attorney and Adjunct Faculty Member at
the Southern New England School of Law. The author is also a 2007
graduate and valedictorian of the Southern New England School of Law
and a 2004 graduate of Hiram College. The author wishes to thank
Professors Frances Rudko and Dwight Duncan and editors Keri Garcia
and Amanda Cooper for their insightful suggestions.
1
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Jan. 11, 1817), in
THE ADAMS-JEFFERSON LETTERS, at 506 (Lester J. Cappon, ed., 1959)
(emphasis added).
2
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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are not referenced anywhere in the United States Constitution
[hereinafter “Constitution”]. This is consistent with the fact
that such an approach was not intended or implemented by
the Framers.
In order to understand the neutrality ideal it is necessary
to understand its evolution. In developing this understanding
it is important to consider the sixteenth and seventeenth
century “tolerance movement” and the development of
religious liberty in the United States.3 This involves
considering the views of James Madison and Thomas
Jefferson. Also, the wall metaphor will be explored as its
infusion into the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme
Court [hereinafter “Supreme Court”] has produced a
tumultuous and unstable area of law. This infusion has
distorted the Religion Clauses and is the primary impediment
to true religious freedom in the United States. Indeed, the
unfortunate consequences of this infusion give new meaning
to Justice Cardozo’s warning that “[m]etaphors in law are to
be narrowly watched, for starting [as] devices to liberate
thought, they end often by enslaving it.”4
In the context of the Religion Clauses, true neutrality
requires not only impartiality and the absence of bias but also
noninvolvement and general disinterest in religion. First, true
neutrality is not possible because actual impartiality is not
possible. Second, true neutrality is not possible because
government and religion share a natural connection, which
precludes noninvolvement and discourages disinterest. The
connection existing between government and religion in
society ensures that there must be a substantial degree of
interaction between the two.
With a fresh memory of religious tyranny in Europe, it is
not surprising that many of the colonists were eager to secure
religious liberty after the Revolutionary War. The premiere
importance of religious liberty is alluded to by the fact that
the first sixteen words of the First Amendment to the
3

Throughout this text, “tolerance movement” refers to the gradual
acceptance in popular sentiment of government tolerance of religious
pluralism.
4
Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926).
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Constitution were dedicated to establishing such security.
These sixteen words proscribe government establishment of
religion and prescribe the right of all citizens to freely
exercise their religion. The debates of the First Congress on
the proposed religion amendment, however, do not indicate a
desire to foster government neutrality towards religion and
irreligion. Rather, the debates strongly indicate that the First
Amendment was not intended to mandate such neutrality.
This interpretation is bolstered by the abundant examples in
early America of direct government aid to and involvement
with religion.
Ultimately, because true neutrality is not possible, nearly
all government interaction with religion is to some degree
friendly or hostile. One could argue, therefore, that
government interaction with religion is inherently friendly or
hostile in nature. As a consequence, establishing neutrality as
the ideal misses the mark and has produced a swinging
pendulum in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. At one end
of its arc the pendulum produces hostility towards religion
and at the other end of the arc it produces friendliness
towards religion. This is reflected in case law and in both
early and modern government practices. Ultimately, the
pendulum phenomenon must be brought to an end as it
undermines uniformity, judicial economy, and societal
stability.
Because government interaction with religion is generally
friendly or hostile in nature, the question then becomes
whether to adopt a friendly or hostile approach. Of the two,
for a myriad of reasons, it is better to adopt a friendly
approach. Nonpreferentialism represents the ideal friendly
approach.5 This is true for four reasons. First,
nonpreferentialism does not require neutrality between
religion and irreligion, which is more aligned with the
original understanding of the Religion Clauses.6 Second, it is
5

Nonpreferentialism is the view that government may not prefer one
religion to another religion but may support religion in general. See
discussion infra Section V, subsection A.
6
This is true, as it appears that these clauses were originally intended
to prevent the national government from endorsing a particular religious
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more consistent with the text of the Religion Clauses as the
clauses themselves do not mandate government neutrality
towards religion. Third, it would allow for nonpreferential aid
to religious institutions, which perform many important social
services. Finally, as Alexis de Tocqueville indicates, religion
encourages morality. It is prudent to adopt a friendly
approach, therefore, because such encouragement is key in
producing government stability and longevity.
II.

THE EVOLUTION OF GOVERNMENTAL
NEUTRALITY TOWARDS RELIGION IN THE
UNITED STATES

This section will examine the sentiments of John Locke7
and Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu8
[hereinafter “Montesquieu”] regarding religious tolerance and
will provide context to the tolerance movement and the
evolution of religious freedom in America. Specific attention
will be given to the views of James Madison and Thomas
Jefferson. A brief summary and review of the struggle for
religious freedom in Virginia follows. Next, the genesis of
the phrase “a wall of separation between church and state”
will be examined. Finally, judicial adoption of this phrase
will be considered together with the resulting impact on the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.
sect or establishing a national church or religion. See discussion infra
Section III, subsection A.
7
John Locke (1632 – 1704) was an English political philosopher. Of
particular note, in his “Second Treatise of Government,” Locke proposed
that a government was truly legitimate only when it protected the natural
rights of life, liberty, and estate and when its governance was based on the
consent of the governed. In his “Second Treatise of Government” Locke
also argued that those governed without their consent had a right to
rebellion. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT
(Thomas P. Peardon ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 1952) (1690).
8
Montesquieu (1689 – 1755) was a Frenchman widely regarded for
his political philosophy. He argued that the essential functions of
government could be divided into three categories: legislative, executive,
and judicial. He argued that these three functions of government should
be isolated from one another to prevent the consolidation and corruption
of government power.
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A. Locke, Montesquieu, and the Tolerance
Movement
The Framers were true products of the Enlightenment
Era. They were well educated.9 They were well read in terms
of both classic and modern political philosophy.10 Indeed,
many of the Framers were great political thinkers in their own
right. There is no better testament to this fact than that
document which sets forth the organic scaffolding for our
unique system of government—the Constitution.
The Constitution was formulated to produce a system of
government that would last throughout the ages. While many
aspects of the Constitution are novel and owe their genesis to
the minds of the Framers, it is important to keep in mind that
the Framers were heavily influenced by Enlightenment
political philosophy. The Enlightenment brought about a
revolution in systematic rationality. The era is characterized,
in part, by a resurgence and infusion of systematic thought,
which produced principled and well-reasoned treatises on
government.
In particular, many Enlightenment philosophers
considered the relationship between government and
religion.11 This issue was considered by Locke in A Letter
Concerning Toleration12 and by Montesquieu in The Spirit of
Laws.13 These important and influential works provide
context to the development of religious liberty in America.
9

See generally M.E. BRADFORD, FOUNDING FATHERS: BRIEF LIVES
OF THE FRAMERS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (University Press
of Kansas 1994) (1981) (detailing the educational backgrounds of the
individual Framers and concluding that they were highly educated).
10
Id.
11
Implicit in this notion is the idea that a relationship must exist
between government and religion.
12
JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (Prometheus
Books 1990) (1689).
13
CHARLES DE SECONDAT BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF
LAWS (Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller, & Harold Stone, trans.,
Prometheus Books 2002) (1748) (Originally published in French as “De
l'Esprit des Lois”).

118

Trends and Issues in Constitutional Law

Vol. 2

American religious liberty was born out of the tolerance
movement, which these works helped to produce.
The influence of Locke is heavily reflected in the
Declaration of Independence14 and is well documented in the
contentious colonial debates concerning ratification of the
Constitution.15 Locke’s treatise on toleration “became a bible
to many in the eighteenth century, who were still contending
against the old theories of religious uniformity.”16 In A Letter
Concerning Toleration, Locke examines the relationship
between religion and government. Locke argues that above
all things it is necessary to “distinguish exactly the business
of civil government from that of religion.”17 Locke argues
that government does not naturally have the authority to
compel the acceptance of particular religious beliefs and that
such authority cannot be granted to it by consent of the
people as “no man can so far abandon the care of his own
salvation as blindly to leave it to the choice of any other.”18
Overall, Locke strongly advocates government tolerance of
religious beliefs.19 While he attributes much civil unrest to
religious intolerance and the use of force to compel religious
belief, Locke does not advocate neutrality towards religion.

14

This is true both in its formal recital of life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness as inalienable rights and more broadly by the encapsulated
notion that those governed without their consent have a right to rebellion.
See generally THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
15
See Arthur Lee, Reply to Wilson’s Speech: ‘Cincinnatus’ V, in 1
THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788, 114, 119 (Bernard
Bailyn, ed., 1993) (In the New York Journal on Nov. 29, 1787 Arthur Lee
admonishes his partner in debate for not having read Locke.); See also
Cato III, in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788, supra at
214, 216 (article discussing Locke’s theories of government and the
necessity of securing life, liberty, and estate that was originally published
in the New York Journal on Oct. 25, 1787).
16
Library of Congress Exhibition, Religion and the Founding of the
American Republic, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/rel02.html (last
visited Nov. 15, 2006).
17
LOCKE, supra note 12, at 18.
18
Id. at 19.
19
Id. at 19.
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Rather, he strongly advocates the use of rational persuasion to
encourage religious morality.20
The influence of Montesquieu on the Framers is clear as
“[e]ven a cursory examination of the Constitution reveals the
influence of Montesquieu’s thesis.”21 In his Spirit of
Governments article printed in the National Gazette on
February 20, 1792, Madison himself described the works of
Montesquieu as having “lifted the veil from the venerable
errors which enslaved opinion, and pointed the way to those
luminous truths of which he had but a glimpse himself.”22 In
The Spirit of Laws Montesquieu performs a careful
examination of the connection between government, religion,
and morality. In this treatise Montesquieu advocates religious
tolerance but distinguishes between tolerating and approving
a religion.23 Based on this distinction Montesquieu finds it is
necessary for civil laws to prevent religions from
“embroiling” the state and from causing disturbances
amongst themselves.24 Montesquieu urges that “[h]uman
laws, made to direct the will, ought to give precepts, and not
counsels; religion, made to influence the heart, should give
many counsels, and few precepts.”25
Montesquieu, however, does not advocate government
neutrality towards religion. Rather, he thinks that religion has
helped to tame government tyranny and proclaims “we owe
to Christianity, in government, a certain political law…[as it
represents] a benefit which human nature can never
sufficiently acknowledge.”26 For instance, he observes that
20

Id. at 20.
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986). See, e.g., THE
FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (on the separation of powers). In
addition, the “celebrated” Montesquieu was referenced explicitly during
the debates on the constitutional convention of 1787 and during the
colonial debates surrounding ratification of the Constitution.
22
JAMES MADISON, Spirit of Governments, NAT’L GAZETTE, Feb. 20,
1792 reprinted in JAMES MADISON WRITINGS, 509, 510 (Jack N. Rakove,
ed., The Library of America 1999) (1792).
23
MONTESQUIEU, supra note 13, at 51-52.
24
Id. at 52.
25
Id. at 32.
26
Id. at 29.
21
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religion has influenced princes to display greater humanity
and self-control and rendered them more likely to be directed
by laws.27 Montesquieu states “the Christian religion, which
ordains that men should love each other, would, without
doubt, have every nation blest with the best civil law, the best
political laws; because these, next to this religion, are the
greatest good that men can give and receive.”28 For these
reasons Montesquieu advocates government tolerance of
religious beliefs. It is also important to note that Montesquieu
rejects the notion that all religions benefit government.29
Overall, it appears unlikely that the Framers would have seen
Montesquieu as advocating either a complete separation of
religion from government or establishing absolute neutrality
as the ideal relationship between the two.
In short, Locke and Montesquieu significantly influenced
the Framers. In religion, this influence is most clearly
reflected in the tolerance movement that spread throughout
America during the late eighteenth century. The tolerance
movement planted the seed for what would later become the
unique notion of religious liberty and independence in
America. As discussed below, this movement did not
necessarily embrace government neutrality towards religion.
B. The Evolution of Religious Liberty in Colonial
America
American colonization was fueled by a desire to escape
religious persecution in Europe. Interestingly, many think
that the Pilgrims came to America because the Pilgrims
wanted freedom for everyone to practice different religions.
This common misconception is patently false. Rather, the
Pilgrims came to America because they wanted everyone to
have the freedom to practice the Pilgrims’ religious beliefs.
Thus, it is not surprising that religious intolerance and
27

Id. at 29.
Id. at 27.
29
See id. at 30 (arguing that while we ought to embrace Christianity,
we ought to reject “Mahommedan religions” as they have a destructive
influence).
28
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persecution is legion throughout the historical record of both
Europe and colonial America. As Thomas Jefferson observed
in his Notes on the State of Virginia, the first settlers to
Virginia became possessed “of the powers of making,
administering, and executing laws, [which] showed equal
intolerance in this country with their Presbyterian brethren,
who had emigrated to the northern government.”30 Therefore,
as the accounts of settlers such as Roger Williams and Anne
Hutchinson illustrate, religious hostility predates religious
tolerance in America.31
Religious tolerance in America can be traced to the
colonies in Maryland, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Delaware,
and Carolina. “These colonies, though established as
sanctuaries for particular groups of religious dissenters,
extended freedom of religion to groups—although often
limited to Christian groups—beyond their own.”32
Throughout the mid-seventeenth century these colonies
expressly provided for free exercise of the Christian religion.
While this is far from true religious tolerance, it is certainly a
step in that direction. For instance, in 1649 with its Act
Concerning Religion, the Maryland Assembly enacted the
first “free exercise” law.33 Rhode Island’s Charter of 1663
went even further by protecting “residents from being ‘in any
ways molested, punished, disquieted, or called into question,
for any differences in opinion, in matters of religion, [which]
do not actually disturb the civil peace of our said colony.’”34
The tolerance movement spread rapidly and by 1789 “every
State but Connecticut had incorporated some version of a free
30

THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 150
(Harper & Row 1964).
31
During the seventeenth century both Williams and Hutchinson
were banished from the Massachusetts Bay Colony due essentially to
religious intolerance.
32
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 551 (1997) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
33
Id. The Maryland Act Concerning Religion provided “[n]o person .
. . professing to believe in Jesus Christ, shall from henceforth be any ways
troubled, Molested or discountenanced for or in respect of his or her
religion nor in the free exercise thereof.” Id.
34
Id. (quoting Rhode Island Charter of 1663).
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exercise clause into its constitution.”35 As such, the tolerance
movement played an essential role in developing religious
liberty in America.
The principal advocates of religious liberty in America
were James Madison and Thomas Jefferson. The positions
advocated by Madison and Jefferson represents what can be
properly characterized as an apex in colonial sentiment with
regard to religious freedom. It is from the shadowy regions of
this apex that the neutrality ideal would later emerge.
Madison believed that danger resulted from “a direct mixture
of Religion & civil Government,”36 and he argued that there
is “not a shadow of right in the general government to
intermeddle with religion.”37 Madison believed such
intermeddling “would be a most flagrant usurpation.”38
Further, both men share the notion that religion and
government “will both exist in greater purity, the less they are
mixed together.”39 While this is not a per se endorsement of
neutrality, it is surely a step in that general direction.
Both Madison and Jefferson played a fundamental role in
championing religious liberty in Virginia. Although Virginia
35

Id. at 553.
JAMES MADISON, Detached Memoranda, in JAMES MADISON
WRITINGS, supra note 22 at 510 (emphasis added). Qualifying the
mixture as being “direct” seemingly implies either that there either may
not be such a danger with an indirect mixture of government and religion
or that while there may be some danger that an indirect mixture is
unavoidable and therefore not worthy of comment.
37
JAMES MADISON, Speech in the Virginia Ratifying Convention on
Taxation, a Bill of Rights, and the Mississippi, in JAMES MADISON
WRITINGS, supra note 22 at 382 (emphasis added) (Madison’s use of the
word “general” in qualifying government likely refers to the federal
government. This of course indicates that there is a corresponding state
right to “intermeddle with religion.”).
38
Id. In keeping with this is the indication that general government
intermeddling would represent usurpation—seemingly of state authority.
Further support for this interpretation is gained from the fact that Madison
articulated essentially this same argument during the First Congress’s
debates on the religion amendment.
39
Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1882),
in JAMES MADISON WRITINGS, supra note 22 at 789 (The 1786 Act for
Establishing Religious Freedom in Virginia, written by Jefferson, appears
to strongly support this notion).
36
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provided for free exercise of religion and had disestablished
the Church of England in 1776, it did not prohibit the support
of Christianity by generally assessed taxes.40 Jefferson
opposed such taxes and drafted a bill to establish greater
religious freedom in Virginia.41 Jefferson’s bill was addressed
and debated in the General Assembly in 1779 but was not
adopted.42 A majority of the Virginia General Assembly
clearly rejected Jefferson’s radical views on religious liberty.
Consequently, on December 24, 1784, Virginia
Congressman Patrick Henry “introduced ‘A Bill Establishing
a Provision for the Teachers of the Christian Religion,’ which
proposed that citizens be taxed in order to support the
Christian denomination of their choice, with those taxes not
designated for any specific denomination to go to a public
fund to aid seminaries.”43 This proposal generated great
controversy.44 In light of this controversy, the Virginia
General Assembly voted to postpone consideration of the
religious assessment bill until the next legislative session.45
In response to Patrick Henry’s proposed bill, a Baptist’s
petition circulated opposing religious assessments on
November 17, 1785.46 Madison, however, led the chief
opposition to the religious assessment bill. Madison wrote the
40

Boerne, 521 U.S. at 560 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); See generally,
JEFFERSON, supra note 30 at 150-51; See also, the 1776 Amendments to
the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which stipulated that “it is the mutual
duty of all to practice Christian forbearance, love, and charity towards
each other.” JAMES MADISON, Amendments to the Virginia Declaration of
Rights, in JAMES MADISON WRITINGS, supra note 22 at 10 (emphasis
added).
41
Library of Congress Exhibition, Religion and the Founding of the
American Republic, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/rel05.html (last
visited Nov. 15, 2006).
42
Id.
43
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 560 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
44
This is well exemplified by the move to postpone voting on the
religious assessment bill so as to bolster support in opposition of it. See,
Library of Congress Exhibition, supra note 41.
45
Madison led the move to postpone the bill. Id. Notably, future
Chief Justice John Marshall was among those who voted for the tax
assessment and against postponing the bill. Id.
46
Id.
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Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,
which pragmatically detailed and delineated fifteen separate
points in opposition to Henry’s proposed bill. Ultimately,
Madison’s petition grounded his objection to Henry’s bill on
the belief that it violated an “unalienable” natural right to
freedom of religion.47 When the General Assembly of
Virginia revisited the issue in 1785, not only was Madison
able to defeat the proposed bill, but also in January 1786, he
was able to secure passage of Jefferson’s “Act for
Establishing Religious Freedom.”48 While Jefferson’s Act fell
short of mandating government neutrality towards religion,
proponents of religious liberty viewed passage of this Act as
a great victory. The passage represented a concrete shift from
mere tolerance to the establishment of religious freedom as a
natural and inalienable right. More specifically, the Act
proclaimed:
Well aware that Almighty God hath created the
mind free…it [is] therefore enacted by the
General Assembly, That no man shall be
compelled to frequent or support any religious
worship, place or ministry whatsoever, nor shall
be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened
in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer
on account of his religious opinion or beliefs’
but that all men shall be free to profess, and by
argument to maintain, their opinions in matters
of religion, and that the same shall in nowise
diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil
capacities…[T]o declare this act irrevocable,
would be of no effect in law, yet we are free to
declare, and do declare, that the rights hereby
asserted are of the natural rights of mankind,
and that if any act shall be hereafter passed to
repeal the present or to narrow its operation,

47
48

Id.
Id.
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such act will be an infringement of natural
right.49
It is also important to briefly consider Madison’s Notes of
Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787. The majority of
Madison’s Constitutional Convention notes referencing
religion are inconsistent with a strict separation approach.50
Indeed, most can be accurately characterized as antithetical to
the neutrality ideal. Still, there are a few passages that
advocate for some degree of separation between the two. For
instance, on June 6, 1787, Madison cautions that “[r]eligion
itself may become a motive to persecution and oppression—
[t]hese observations are verified by the Histories of every
Country ancient [and] modern.”51 In addition, on August 30,
1787, Mr. Charles Pinkney successfully moved to add to
Article VI of the Constitution that “no religious test shall be
required as a qualification to any office or public trust under
the authority of the U[nited] States.”52
Finally, Madison’s notes indicate that on September 14,
1787 he and Mr. Pinkney moved to list the establishment of
“an University, in which no preferences or distinctions should
be allowed on account of Religion” as a vested right of
Congress.53 The motion ultimately was defeated as six states
voted against adoption and only 4 states voted in support of
it.54 Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, and South
Carolina voted in support of the motion. New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and
Georgia voted against the motion.55 Connecticut was divided
49

JEFFERSON, supra note 30, at 206-08.
JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, 209-11 (W.W. Norton & Company 1987) (1920)
(detailing Benjamin Franklin’s proposed prayer during the Constitutional
Convention).
51
Id. at 76.
52
Id. at 561 (All states voted to approve this language except
Maryland, which was divided on the issue, and North Carolina, which
voted against the motion.).
53
Id. at 639.
54
Id. at 639.
55
Id. at 639.
50
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on the issue.56 While Madison’s notes do not reveal why the
states opposed it, it is likely that they opposed for religious
considerations. The neutrality ideal is also undermined by the
fact that Ben Franklin successfully called to open each day of
the Constitutional Convention with prayer on June 28,
1787.57
C. Thomas Jefferson and the Wall of Separation
Thomas Jefferson was an influential figure in America
during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. As
the primary author of the Declaration of Independence, the
third President of the United States, and a champion of
religious tolerance and liberty, Jefferson’s views on religious
liberty are reflected not only in his Act for Establishing
Religious Freedom in Virginia but also in his professional
and personal correspondence and his book, Notes on the State
of Virginia [hereinafter “Notes”].
Jefferson recited in his Notes that freedom of conscience
is a natural right.58 Jefferson reasons that our government
only has authority over the natural rights that we submit to
them and that we have not, nor could we ever, submit to the
government our rights of conscience.59 Jefferson
contemplates that the “legitimate powers of government
extend only to such acts as are injurious to others.”60 With
characteristic eloquence, Jefferson states, “it does me no
injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods or no
God. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.”61
Throughout his life Jefferson was an advocate of church
and state separation.62 Historian Leonard Levy remarked this
56

Id. at 639.
Id. at 209-11.
58
JEFFERSON, supra note 30, at 152. This sentiment is also reflected
in the above quoted passage from Jefferson’s 1786 Act for Establishing
Religious Freedom in Virginia.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
LEONARD LEVY, JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER
SIDE, 8 (Harvard University Press 1963).
57
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was a position that Jefferson clearly defined, publicly stated,
and vigorously defended.63 From his extensive research on
Jefferson, Levy concluded “[a]lthough it exposed him to
abusive criticism he carried on his fight for separation of
church and state, and for the free exercise of religion,
throughout his long public career without significant
contradictions.”64 This is well exemplified by Jefferson’s
recorded correspondence.
For example, in his January 23, 1808 letter to Rev.
Samuel Miller, Jefferson explains his reluctance as President
to continue the tradition of his predecessors and recommend a
day of fasting and prayer.65 This supports Jefferson’s thought
that even indirect government involvement with religion
ought to be avoided. Yet the prudence of such an approach is
seemingly called into question by Jefferson’s own rhetorical
assertion that “the liberties of a nation [cannot] be thought
secure when we have removed their only firm basis, a
conviction in the minds of the people that these liberties are
of the gift of God.”66 Still, Jefferson opines that simply
recommending a religious observance would be to “indirectly
assume to the U.S. an authority over religious exercises
which the Constitution has directly precluded them from.”67
Jefferson noted that the religious recommendations of his
predecessors were made without due consideration of the
general government’s authority and that the right to make
such representations rested only in the state governments.68
63

Id. at 15.
Id. at 15.
65
University of Virginia Library Electronic Text Center, Thomas
Jefferson 1743-1826 Letters http://etext.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/public
(Last visited Nov. 15, 2006).
66
JEFFERSON, supra note 30, at 156.
67
Id.
68
Id. While this is true, it is notable that Jefferson nevertheless did
have some involvement with religion. See e.g. Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421, 447 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting). On March 4, 1805, President
Jefferson proclaimed:
I shall need, too, the favor of that Being in whose hands
we are, who led our fathers, as Israel of old…and to
whose goodness I ask you to join in supplications with
me that He will so enlighten the minds of your servants,
64
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This reflects the general understanding of our federalism as
representing a system of dual sovereignties and is
inconsistent with the neutrality ideal. Seemingly if the power
to aid religion was reserved to the states, the First
Amendment did not mandate neutrality.
The quintessential representation of Jefferson’s opinion
regarding church and state involvement is contained in his
1802 letter to the Danbury Baptist Association.69 Jefferson
wrote that the language contained in the Religion Clauses
built “a wall of separation between church and state.”70
Notably, the wall metaphor was first used by Roger Williams,
who advocated for a “hedge or wall of separation between the
garden of the church and the wilderness of the world.”71
While the wall metaphor may be representative of Jefferson’s
personal view on the matter, it is doubtful it authoritatively
illustrates the First Congress’s intent in formulating the
Religion Clauses. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist persistently
guide their councils, and prosper their measures that
whatsoever they do shall result in your good, and shall
secure to you the peace, friendship, and approbation of
all nations. Id.
69
Library of Congress Exhibition, Religion and the Founding of the
American Republic, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/f0605as.jpg
(last visited Nov. 15, 2006) (Jefferson’s letter was written in response to a
congratulatory letter he received from the Danbury Baptist Association).
70
Id. The Library of Congress extends thanks to the Federal Bureau
of Investigation Laboratory, specifically:
[F]or recovering the lines obliterated from the [original]
Danbury Baptist letter by Thomas Jefferson. He
originally wrote “a wall of eternal separation between
church and state,” later deleting the word “eternal”…[as
he] must have been unhappy with the uncompromising
tone of [the phrase], especially in view of the
implications of his decision, two days later, to begin
attending church services in the House of
Representatives.
Library of Congress Exhibition, Religion and the Founding of the
American Republic, http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/rel06-2.html
(last visited November 15, 2006).
71
Roger Williams, Mr. Cotton's Letter Lately Printed, Examined and
Answered, in 1 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS, 108
(1644).
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questioned Jefferson’s status as an “ideal source of
contemporary history as to the meaning of the Religion
Clauses.”72 Justice Rehnquist observed that Jefferson was “of
course in France at the time…the Bill of Rights were debated
by Congress and ratified by the States,” and Jefferson’s
“letter to the Danbury Baptist Association was a short note of
courtesy, written 14 years after the Amendments were passed
by Congress.”73 As such, the prudence of treating the wall
metaphor as representative of the intended effect of the
Religion Clauses is questionable at best.
Notwithstanding, in Everson v. Board of Education74,
Justice Black wrote for the majority stating, “[t]he First
Amendment has erected a wall between church and
state…[and that] wall must be kept high and
impregnable…[because we] could not approve the slightest
breach.”75 Justice Black, in holding that a State may provide
funds to bus children to and from parochial schools,
supported this assertion by positing that the First Amendment
mandated government neutrality toward religion.76 Justice
Rutledge dissented from the Supreme Court’s decision. He
argued that the decision was inconsistent with perfect
neutrality toward religion, which he believed was mandated
by the First Amendment.77 More specifically, Rutledge states,
“the object [of the Religion Clauses] was broader than
separating church and state in [the] narrow sense…[rather the
object] was to create a complete and permanent separation of
the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by
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Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
73
Id.
74
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
75
Id. at 18. The Supreme Court’s first use of Jefferson’s Wall phrase
involved the assertion that “[i]n the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of
separation between church and State.’” Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145, 164 (1879) (quoting Jefferson’s 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptists).
76
Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
77
Id. at 31-39.
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comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or
support for religion.”78
The Eversonian notion that the Religion Clauses were
intended to create a wall of separation, mandating
government neutrality towards religion, has significantly
influenced the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. All members
of the Supreme Court, however, have not accepted this
interpretation. In fact, the Rehnquist Court mounted
considerable opposition to this belief.79 Ultimately, the
inherent ambiguity of the Religion Clauses, together with the
controversy surrounding the Eversonian interpretation, has
led to a tumultuous and internally inconsistent body of
jurisprudence.
III.

THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOES NOT MANDATE
NEUTRALITY TOWARDS RELIGION NOR HAS THE
GOVERNMENT ADOPTED IT IN PRACTICE

This section examines the debates of the First Congress
on the proposed religion amendment to the Constitution with
specific focus on whether the recorded debates indicate any
intent to mandate government neutrality towards religion. In
addition, progressivism and the appropriate degree of judicial
deference to the intent of the Framers will be considered.
Finally, eighteenth and nineteenth century United States
government involvement with religion will be briefly
surveyed. More specifically, a review will be made of state
establishment of official religions, state use of religious taxes,
religion and the Declaration of Independence, religion and
the proposed government seals, Presidential reliance on
religion, the use of public prayer, and religion in educational
institutions.
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Id. at 31-32.
Such opposition is perhaps best exemplified by Justice Rehnquist’s
dissenting opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and is most recently exemplified by Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005)
(Plurality).
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A. Debates of the First Congress on the Proposed
Religion Amendments
In the House of Representatives on June 8, 1789, James
Madison proposed that the Constitution be amended to
stipulate that “[t]he civil rights of none shall be abridged on
account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national
religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of
conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.”80
The amendment was soon referred to a Select Committee that
included Madison and nine other representatives.81 The Select
Committee revised Madison’s proposed religion amendment
to state, no “religion shall be established by law, nor shall the
equal rights of conscience be infringed.”82 The revised
amendment was debated in the House on August 15, 1789.
During the debates Representative Peter Sylvester of New
York stated that he “feared [the religion amendment] might
be thought to abolish religion altogether.”83 Representative
Daniel Carroll of Maryland expressed his support for
adopting this version of the amendment and articulated, as the
basis for this support, his belief that “the rights of conscience
are, in their nature, a peculiar delicacy, and will little bear the
gentlest touch of governmental hand.”84 Next, Madison tried
to clarify the scope of the proposed amendment by noting he
“apprehended the meaning of the words to be, that Congress
should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal
observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in
any manner contrary to their conscience.”85 This is a far cry
from mandating government neutrality towards religion or
erecting a high and impregnable wall separating church from
state.
Directly after Madison’s clarification, Representative
Benjamin Huntington of Connecticut responded that he
80

1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (Joseph Gales, ed. 1790).
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 95 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Id.
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ANNALS OF CONG., supra at note 80, at 729.
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Id. at 729.
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Id. at 730.
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feared “that the words might be taken in such latitude as to be
extremely hurtful to the cause of religion...[and while he]
understood the amendment to mean what had been expressed
by [Madison]…others might find it convenient to put another
construction on it.”86 Huntington stated that he feared this
language might actually prevent the compelled support of
religion and he hoped “the amendment would be made in
such a way as to secure the rights of conscience, and the free
exercise of religion, but not to [act as a patron towards] those
who professed no religion at all.”87 Madison responded to the
concerns of Huntington by moving for the word “national” to
be inserted before religion, which he believed “would point
the amendment directly to the object it was intended to
prevent.”88 Representative Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts
then opposed Madison’s use of the word “national” because
the Constitution was ratified with the understanding that it
created a federal and not a national government, which
prompted Madison to withdraw his motion.89
On August 20, 1789, the House adopted a version of the
religion amendment stating “Congress shall make no law
establishing religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof,
or to infringe the rights of conscience,” which it sent to the
Senate for approval.90 The floor debates in the Senate were
kept secret and only a list of motions and votes is included in
the Senate Journal. It is clear though that the version
proposed by the House did generate significant controversy in
the Senate as the Senate Journal lists that three separate
motions to change the amendment were made on September
3, 1789. The controversy was caused by fear in the Senate
that the religion amendment might be interpreted as
completely separating church and state, thereby preventing
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nondiscriminatory aid from being given to religion.91 On
September 3, 1789, the Senate came to an agreement and sent
back to the House a version of the religion amendment
stating, “Congress shall make no law establishing articles of
faith or a mode of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of
religion.”92 The changes made by the Senate to the
amendment allow nondiscriminatory aid to religion.
Ultimately, because the House and Senate could not agree
on the language of the religion amendment, a joint conference
committee was created. On September 24, 1789, the House
considered the report of this committee indicating a
compromise between the House and Senate had been
reached.93 Subsequently, both the House and the Senate
approved a final draft stating, “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof” which is the current language of the First
Amendment.94
Importantly, the First Congress did directly consider the
applicability of the Bill of Rights to the states. On August 17,
1789, South Carolina Representative Thomas Tucker moved
for the Bill of Rights to be applied to the States (hereinafter
“Motion”).95 The Motion was strongly supported by Madison
who opined that the religion amendment was the most
important of all the proposed amendments and that “[i]f there
were any reason to restrain the government of the United
States from infringing upon these essential rights, it was
equally necessary that they should be secured against the
state governments.”96 New Hampshire Representative Samuel
Livermore also supported the motion and proposed that the
Fourth Amendment state, “The equal rights of conscience, the
freedom of speech or of the press, and the right of trial by
91

See generally WALTER BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE
FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Basic Books, Inc. 1976).
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Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 97 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (quoting C. Antieau, et al., Freedom From Federal
Establishment, at 130 (1964)).
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jury in criminal cases, shall not be infringed by any state.”97
Despite Livermore’s support the Motion was nevertheless
defeated in the House98 indicating that a majority of the First
Congress wanted to preserve state aid and involvement with
religion.
As Justice Rehnquist observed, “[i]t seems indisputable
from these glimpses of Madison’s thinking…that he saw the
Amendment as designed to prohibit the establishment of a
national religion, and perhaps to prevent discrimination
among sects…[but] did not see it as requiring neutrality on
the part of government between religion and irreligion.”99
Further, the debates of the First Congress strongly indicate
that the Framers did not intend for government to have no
involvement with religion. In fact, from the debates on the
proposed religion amendment, it can be inferred that the
Framers did not intend the Religion Clauses to create an
impregnable wall separating church from state or mandating
government neutrality towards religion.
Finally, it is necessary to address the requisite deference
to be accorded to the intentions of the Framers regarding
government aid and involvement with religion. Some might
seek to posit progressivism as a means of questioning the
relevance of the Framers’ intentions. Constitutional
progressivism, as classically championed by Justice Brennan,
is rooted in the belief that “the genius of the Constitution
rests not in any static meaning it might have had in a world
that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great
principles to cope with current problems and needs.”100 Of
course, to apply the Constitution’s great principles, one must
97

Id.
It is important to note that while the Framers voted against
applying the Bill of Rights, and therefore the Religion Clauses, to the
states, the Supreme Court has ruled that the Religion Clauses currently
apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, which was
adopted in 1868. See, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940);
See also, Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
99
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 98 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
100
Justice William Brennan, The Constitution of the United States:
Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEXAS L. REV. 433, 438 (1986).
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first understand them. Inasmuch as the Religion Clauses are
seen as mandating neutrality towards religion or erecting a
“high and impregnable wall” separating government and
religion, the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment have
not been properly understood. In its capacity as a conduit for
such notions, progressivism has functioned not as a coping
mechanism but rather as part of the problem.
In explaining his progressive approach, Brennan
admonishes “[i]t is arrogant to pretend that from our vantage
we can gauge accurately the intent of the Framers on
application of principle to specific, contemporary
questions.”101 The proper relationship between government
and religion, however, is hardly a contemporary question. It
is not a question spawned by modern technology or one with
only a contemporary application. Rather, this was a question
that the Framers considered with great care. Therefore,
principles of progressivism may have less force here than
they would in other areas. That is not to say that
progressivism is without merit or that originalism is always
the preferable alternative.102
In the context of the Religion Clauses, however,
progressivism reveals itself as a red herring. Pragmatically,
the application of strict neutrality will create more problems
than it will resolve. In other words, trying to implement strict
neutrality is not progress. More important, progressivism qua
progressivism is a moot point as true government neutrality
towards religion is not possible.
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Id. at 435.
Some scholars have raised the question as to whether “original
intent” actually exists. See, JUDITH BAER, The Fruitless Search for
Original Intent, in REASON IN LAW. (Leif Carter & Thomas Burke eds.,
Pearson Longman Publishers 2001) (arguing that originalism presupposes
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B. Early Government Aid and Involvement with
Religion
Eighteenth and nineteenth century government practices
also indicate that neutrality and a complete separation of
church and state were not intended. An historical survey
reveals that the legacy of government involvement with
religion spans well into the twentieth century. Indeed, such an
approach and its ramifications are readily apparent even in
twenty-first century America.103
First, in considering neutrality, it is important to
remember that many states had official religions at the time
the Constitution was ratified and the Bill of Rights adopted.
For instance, it is well settled that the Church of England was
established as the official religion in Georgia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, New York, and Virginia.104 Ultimately,
“[t]he American Revolution immediately disrupted the
relationship between religion and government in those
states…[because the] Church of England was discredited
during the Revolution by its connection to the Crown and the
loyalist sympathies of most of its clergy.”105 Proponents of
religious freedom, such as Thomas Jefferson, capitalized on
this disruption and sought to utilize such sentiments to
abolish religious discrimination and official state religions.
However, the Puritan or Congregational religion remained
firmly established by law in Connecticut, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, and Vermont.106 Establishments of religion
in these states were “more firmly entrenched and emerged
from the Revolution strengthened by their association with
the patriot cause.”107 In fact, these states continued to provide
103

This will be discussed in greater detail at section V, subsection C,
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legal and financial support for religion after the ratification of
both the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.108 Clearly,
neutrality and strict separation were not envisioned or
implemented in practice.
The principal vehicle for financial support of religion in
America was the levying of religious taxes and assessments.
As the Virginia struggle between Madison and Henry
illustrates, the issue of religious assessments was a divisive
and hotly debated topic. Appeals for such support were made
in a majority of the states. Aside from the substantial support
for religious assessments in Virginia, “general assessment
bills were [also] supported, after 1776, by the legislatures of
five other states and by a galaxy of revolutionary heroes,
including John Adams, Samuel Adams, John Hancock, Roger
Sherman, Oliver Ellsworth, and in neighboring Maryland,
Samuel Chase, William Paca and Charles Carroll.”109 Support
for religious assessments was also memorialized in the
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, which “authorized a
general religious tax to be directed to the church of a
taxpayers’ choice.”110 Such taxes and state establishments
serve to illustrate that neutrality towards religion was not
adopted in practice.
Governmental reliance on religion was memorialized in
the celebrated Declaration of Independence [hereinafter
“Declaration”]. This is of particular relevance given the
inherent importance of the Declaration and the fact that
Thomas Jefferson drafted it—after all he was perhaps the
chief proponent of separating church and state.
The
Declaration justified dissolution of the “political bonds” that
connected American colonists to the British by producing a
detailed list of grievances, which violated the “Laws of
Nature and Nature’s God.”111 Jefferson ends the Declaration
108

See generally id. at 1436.
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with an appeal to “the Supreme Judge of the world” in which
he pledges his support for the Declaration “with a firm
reliance on the protections of divine Providence.”112 To be
sure, the Declaration was important for many reasons.113
Principally, the Declaration and its eloquent reliance on
religion provided the moral justifications that would turn the
cause for colonial independence from a mere insurrection into
a glorious and righteous revolution.
The religious temperament of the Revolutionary era is
also reflected in the quest for an official seal of the United
States. On July 4, 1776, Congress appointed Benjamin
Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and John Adams to create the
official seal.114 Jefferson suggested adopting a depiction of
the “Children of Israel in the Wilderness, led by a Cloud by
Day, and a Pillar of Fire by night.”115 Franklin proposed
adopting the biblical parting of the Red Sea by Moses.116
Notably, both men agreed on an official motto to accompany
the proposed seal: “Rebellion to tyranny; obedience to
God.”117 The three later agreed on Franklin’s version, which
was proposed but not adopted by Congress. The use of
religious imagery for the government seal is particularly
poignant as it was advocated by Jefferson—the man who is
now seen by many as having advocated the high and
impregnable wall of separation.
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Having provided the impetus for the revolution it could arguably
be described as providing the impetus for the Civil War. During his
debates on slavery with Senator Douglas, Abraham Lincoln relied heavily
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and were created equal. See, Lincoln’s Speech at Springfield, Illinois,
June 26, 1857.
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Governmental reliance on religion is also reflected in the
speeches, proclamations, and correspondence of nearly all
Unites States Presidents. Indeed, “[e]ach of our Presidents,
from George Washington to John F. Kennedy, has upon
assuming his Office asked the protection and help of God.”118
As discussed in greater detail below, George Washington
made frequent appeals to religion for both guidance and
political stability. Washington’s predecessors continued his
legacy of advocating formal government reliance on religion.
On March 23, 1798, President John Adams continued the
tradition begun in 1775 and issued a Fast and Thanksgiving
Day Proclamation.119 In his Proclamation, Adams described
prayer as a duty and sought the favorable judgment of God by
directing citizens to “acknowledge before God the manifold
sins and transgressions with which we are justly chargeable
as individuals and as a nation…and to incline us, by His Holy
Spirit, to that sincere repentance and reformation which may
afford us reason to hope for his inestimable favor and
heavenly benediction.”120 Such sentiments continued well
into the twentieth century. As observed by Justice Stewart, in
1961, President John F. Kennedy urged “[w]ith a good
conscience our only sure reward, with history the final judge
of our deeds, let us go forth to lead the land we love, asking
His blessing and His help, but knowing that here on earth
God’s work must truly be our own.”121
Such statements represent only the tip of the iceberg in
terms of officially sanctioned public prayer. On June 28,
1787, Franklin successfully called for such prayer to open
each day of the Constitutional Convention.122 In its initial
meeting in September of 1774, Congress invited Reverend
118
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Jacob Duché to open its session with prayer.123 When Duché
defected to the British, on October 1, 1777, Congress
appointed William White and George Duffield, each
representing a different religious denomination, as his
successors.124 Church services were held in the House of
Representatives until after the Civil War and literally used the
podium of the Speaker as a preacher’s pulpit.125 Chaplains
were used not only by Congress but also by the military and
in state and federal prisons.126
To this day every session of Congress is opened with a
publicly financed prayer.127 Since 1777, the salary of all such
chaplains has been paid for with public funds.128 Also, at the
beginning of each United States Supreme Court Session, “one
of our officials invokes the protection of God…[because
since] the days of John Marshall our Crier has said, ‘God
save the United States and this Honorable Court.’”129 Such
practices surely reflect the notion that government may rely
on religion but that it should strive to do so in a
nondiscriminatory manner. Such an interpretation is
consistent with the fact that in 1952 Congress enacted 36
U.S.C. §185, which calls upon the President to proclaim a
National Day of Prayer each year.130
It is also important to briefly survey early government aid
and involvement with religion in the context of education.
The United States is heavily reliant on educational
institutions to produce moral and intellectual sustenance for
the government. Such reliance was explicitly referenced in
the Northwest Ordinance, which was adopted by Congress in
1787 to regulate territories northwest of the Ohio River.
Specifically, Article three of the Northwest Ordinance
123
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pronounces that “Religion, Morality and knowledge being
necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind,
Schools and the means of education shall be forever
encouraged.”131 As Justice Rehnquist observed, in 1789 the
First Congress reenacted this ordinance on the same day that
Madison proposed his religion amendment, which appears to
“confirm the view that Congress did not mean that the
Government should be neutral between religion and
irreligion.”132
Kent Greenawalt, Professor of Law at Columbia
University, remarks that from the outset “education in the
early American colonies was almost entirely private and
substantially religious.”133 This is relevant because up to and
throughout the nineteenth century, both state and municipal
governments subsidized religious schools on a per pupil
basis.134 Religion also played a significant role in public
schools. Professor Greenawalt found that “the character of
the original public schools was indisputably a broad
nondenominational Protestantism…[and although] schools
were ‘non-sectarian’ their teaching and practice were
significantly religious.”135
This review is not intended to serve as a recommendation
to reinstate all the religious practices of the forefathers of the
United States. Rather, it is intended to survey the religious
heritage of the United States and to indicate that the First
Amendment was not understood to mandate impartiality
towards religion and irreligion. Simply put, the history of
early government aid and involvement with religion is
inconsistent with Jefferson’s wall metaphor and can hardly be
said to represent government neutrality towards religion.
131
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GOVERNMENT MUST INTERACT WITH RELIGION
AND SUCH INTERACTION IS GENERALLY
FRIENDLY OR HOSTILE TOWARDS RELIGION

This section will review the natural connection between
government and religion and the notion that this connection
ensures that government must have some relationship with
religion. In maintaining such a relationship, generally
speaking, the government is either friendly or hostile towards
particular religions. This phenomenon will be discussed in
relation to the modern neutrality ideal. Further, a survey of
modern case law and government practices will illustrate that
government action has been friendly or hostile towards
particular religions.
A. The Natural Connection between Government
and Religion and its Implications
Government and religion share a natural connection as
human institutions. More specifically, both government and
religion are collective institutions as they coordinate the
cooperative efforts of individuals and function as
mechanisms of social order, progress, and advantage. By
virtue of their status as collective institutions an inherent
connection exists between the two entities. Inasmuch as
humans are natural beings, both institutions are products of
nature. For this reason, the connection existing between the
two can be described as natural—in a literal sense.
Despite their natural connection, many insist that
government and religion must occupy separate and distinct
spheres in the realm of human existence. This presupposes
that government and religion are capable of being relegated
to separate and distinct spheres. Notably, such a separation
would require relegation because the two are naturally
intertwined by their status as human institutions. With regard
to this it is important to briefly review the “state-society”
distinction discussed by Harvard Professor Harvey
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Mansfield, in his treatise, America’s Constitutional Soul.136
This distinction generally involves the notion that the “state,
which is public, is in the service of society, which is private;
and the state is limited to this service as a means is limited by
its end.”137 Professor Mansfield recognized that, “[m]odern
constitutional government is limited government in which the
limitation on government is expressed in the distinction
between state and society.”138 In order to consider the natural
connection between government and religion, it is first
necessary to define and develop an understanding of “state”
and “society” as independent concepts. This is necessary,
although perhaps counterintuitive, as human civilization
naturally intertwines the two.
On one hand, the state encompasses the realm of
constitutional government and is a product of human
nature.139 The state has power over the physical realm and in
keeping with “the premise of modern constitutionalism …
government is constituted by humans to answer human
needs.”140 On the other hand, while it is also a product of
human nature, society encompasses the realm of the
conscience or soul.141 Society has power over the spiritual
realm and as it encompasses religion “is primarily concerned
with saving souls, not with constitutional freedom.”142 Both
government and religion provide protection and sustenance—
government protects and sustains the body and religion
protects and sustains the soul. Overall, the glue that holds this
system together is the byproduct of protection in both
instances—stability. Because government and religion each
require stability and when properly instituted government and
religion each produce stability, the two crave, if not depend,
on each other for survival.
136
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Given interdependence of government and religion and
the importance of protecting both the body and soul, it is
prudent to institute an arrangement that does not secure one at
the expense of the other. Yet, Mansfield implies that today
the “self” passes for the soul and has replaced the soul’s
search for spiritual perfection with the quest for material
well-being.143 Mansfield attributes this to an imbalance in the
state society continuum whereby “the soul gradually
abdicates its ruling function” and results in the “apathetic
individualism Tocqueville feared, which we see in the wishywashy liberal and the uncaring conservative.”144
Ultimately, government and religion can be understood as
representing two sides of the same coin. On one side of the
coin is religion and on the other side of the coin is
government. The coin itself is modern civilization. This is an
apt metaphor for three reasons. First, state and society are the
respective homes for government and religion. Government
and religion protect and sustain the body and the soul
respectively. Each of the preceding distinctions can be seen
as representing two sides that combine to form one whole—
as is true with a coin. Second, government and religion enjoy
a symbiotic relationship in which they are dependent to a
large degree on each other. In other words, if we try to
separate the two sides of the coin, the coin itself will be
destroyed.
Third, government and religion must be separated to
some degree because “the soul, in its unruly desire to rule
itself, [may try] to rule other souls.”145 In other words, a
religious faction existing in society may seek to use the
power of the government to rule the whole of society.
Government and religion, therefore, should not morph
together to form a single institution just as the images on a
double-sided coin cannot leave their respective locations to
form a single sided coin. If we try to literally combine the
two sides of the coin, the coin will again be destroyed. For
this reason it is important that we try to find a state of
143
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equilibrium where religion and government are neither
separated as two unrelated institutions nor are merged
together as one single institution.
From this understanding it is clear that government must
have some relationship with religion. Finding the state of
equilibrium is of course no easy task. The Religion Clauses
do not provide a simple recipe with which to achieve this.
Such a recipe, if it is to exist at all, must be discerned from
practice—from a process of trial and error. Striving to reach
that state of equilibrium is a difficult task indeed. The task,
however, is made more difficult when government neutrality
towards religion is established as the primary objective. This
is true for three reasons. First, neutrality has been interpreted
to mean that we must erect a high and impregnable wall
separating government and religion. Such an approach favors
irreligion by precluding the government from providing
religion with nonpreferential support. Favoring irreligion as
such is clearly hostile to religion and cannot accurately be
characterized as fostering impartiality, which is the apparent
objective of neutrality. Second, because it has produced
hostility towards religion, neutrality does not treat religion
and government as two sides of the same coin. This has the
practical effect of reducing stability and producing a less
stable government. Finally, pragmatically speaking, neutrality
is impossible to achieve. True neutrality requires actual
impartiality. Actual impartiality is seemingly unattainable, as
it would require not only divorcing oneself from personal
preferences and predilections, but also a consideration of all
possible factors and contingencies.
In considering neutrality it is important to keep in mind
the dualism, which is contained in the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment. A close examination of the Religion
Clauses reveals an inescapable tension between the two. On
the one hand, the First Amendment is inherently friendly to
religion by virtue of its stipulation that Congress shall make
no law prohibiting the free exercise of religion. On the other
hand, the First Amendment is inherently hostile to religion in
that it also prescribes that Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion. Given this
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dichotomy, it is not surprising that nearly all attempts at
neutrality have produced an action or decision that is
inherently friendly or hostile towards religion. That is, most
governmental attempts at neutrality can be characterized as
producing a result that is either favorable or unfavorable
towards religion.
B. Case Law Illustrates that Government
Interaction with Religion is Inherently Hostile
or Friendly
In considering government interaction with religion it is
helpful to review the jurisprudence surrounding the Religion
Clauses. For this reason a summary will be made of the
Supreme Court’s modern Free Exercise and Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. Specific attention will be given to the
various tests formulated by the Supreme Court to identify
violations of the clauses. The summary will also highlight the
government and religion interaction and show that such
interaction is generally hostile or friendly in nature.
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
prescribes that Congress shall make no law prohibiting the
free exercise of religion. While this language may seem
straightforward to a casual observer, it must be considered
relative to the First Amendment’s mandate that Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.
Applying these principles to cases or controversies has
proven to be an arduous task due in large part to the
ambiguity of the Religion Clauses. While the language
contained in the clauses gives some guidance as to the proper
relationship between government and religion, it does not
provide a clear map with which to navigate the waters of
every such interaction. This ambiguity in turn has resulted in
a tumultuous body of jurisprudence, which can best be
described as a swinging pendulum. At one end of the
pendulum’s arc, the Supreme Court has given great strength
to the Establishment Clause at the expense of the Free
Exercise Clause. This is the hostile arc of the pendulum. The
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Pendulum, however, began to swing in the opposite direction
with Sherbert v. Verner.146
Sherbert involved a situation where a Seventh-Day
Adventist was terminated by her employer for refusing to
work on Saturday, which is considered to be the Sabbath Day
for all Seventh-Day Adventists. Unable to find other work,
Ms. Sherbert filed a claim for unemployment compensation
benefits pursuant to the South Carolina Unemployment
Compensation Act (hereinafter referred to as “Act”). The Act
stipulated that an applicant is not eligible for benefits if they
have failed to accept suitable work when offered without
good cause. Consequently, the South Carolina Employment
Security
Commission
denied
her
unemployment
compensation on the ground that her refusal to work
Saturdays prevented her from accepting suitable work. The
decision of the commission was upheld by both the Court of
Common Pleas for Spartanburg County and the South
Carolina Supreme Court.147
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the South
Carolina Supreme Court. Writing for the majority, Justice
Brennan held the denial of unemployment benefits to Ms.
Sherbert restricted the free exercise of her religion. Following
this determination Brennan stated “[w]e must next consider
whether some compelling state interest enforced in the
eligibility provisions of the South Carolina statute justifies
the substantial infringement of appellant’s First Amendment
right.”148 The Supreme Court explicitly rejected the rational
basis approach by stating, “no showing merely of a rational
relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice; in
this highly sensitive constitutional area, ‘only the gravest
abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for
permissible limitation.’”149 Ultimately, the Supreme Court
found that South Carolina’s interest in denying
unemployment benefits to Ms. Sherbert did not justify the
restriction of her right to freely exercise her religion.
146
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The Supreme Court also found that compelling South
Carolina to extend unemployment benefits did not violate the
Establishment Clause. Brennan stated that in rendering such a
holding the Supreme Court is not fostering the establishment
of the Seventh-Day Adventist religion as “the extension of
unemployment benefits to Sabbatarians in common with
Sunday worshippers reflects nothing more than the
governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious
differences, and does not represent that involvement of
religion with secular institutions which it is the object of the
Establishment Clause to forestall.”150 But was the Supreme
Court’s decision truly neutral? Would this decision and the
adoption of the strict scrutiny standard be more accurately
characterized as friendly towards religion? This conclusion
was alluded to by Justice Stewart, who observed that the
Supreme Court’s holding requires North Carolina to “prefer a
religious over a secular ground for being unavailable for
work.”151 Requiring such a preference, despite its benign
motive, is friendly towards religion. Implementing strict
scrutiny in place of the rational basis test is also friendly
towards religion.
The same would not be true if the Supreme Court upheld
the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court. To deny
unemployment compensation to an individual whose
religious beliefs preclude her from working on Saturdays
cannot be described as friendly toward religion. To the
contrary, such a decision is more accurately characterized as
hostile to religion. Therefore, neutrality was a red herring in
the Supreme Court’s analysis as the Justices were forced to
choose between two alternatives—one that is friendly
towards religion and the other that is hostile towards religion.
In an effort to clarify the bounds of the Establishment
Clause, in 1971 the Supreme Court created a three-prong test
in Lemon v. Kurtzman.152 The Lemon test provides that to be
consistent with the Establishment Clause, government action
must have 1) a secular purpose, 2) a primary effect that
150
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neither advances nor inhibits religion, and 3) must not foster
an excessive governmental entanglement with religion.153 In
Lemon, the Supreme Court relied on this test in striking down
Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes that provided state
aid to religious schools regarding instruction in secular
matters. To deny such aid only to religious schools is hostile
towards religion. Again, the alternative, upholding the Rhode
Island and Pennsylvania statutes, would be favorable or
friendly towards religion.
Ultimately, the Lemon test reflects an attempt “to add
some mortar to Everson's wall.”154 At best the Lemon test
provides little guidance to the Supreme Court and at worst it
solidifies a misunderstanding of the Establishment Clause as
it perpetuates the neutrality ideal. Further, the test functions
primarily as a conduit for religious hostility. Justice
Rehnquist observed that reliance on the Lemon test distorts
the Establishment Clause as it “bristles with hostility to all
things religious in public life.”155 Rehnquist states that the
Lemon test “has simply not provided adequate standards for
deciding Establishment Clause cases…[because the test]
represents a determined effort to craft a workable rule from a
historically faulty doctrine; but the rule can only be as sound
as the doctrine it attempts to service.”156
In the 1972 case of Wisconsin v. Yoder,157 the Supreme
Court had an opportunity to review its Free Exercise
jurisprudence. In Yoder, the Supreme Court considered
whether the conviction of an Amish man, for violating
Wisconsin’s compulsory school attendance law based on the
tenants of his faith, could be upheld without violating the
Free Exercise Clause.158 Chief Justice Burger, writing for a
153
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six-justice majority, applied strict scrutiny and, although the
law was neutral on its face, held that the Wisconsin law “in
its application, nonetheless offend[s] the constitutional
requirement for governmental neutrality [because] it unduly
burden[ed] the free exercise of religion.”159 Carving out a
religious exception to a generally applicable law is more
accurately characterized as friendly rather than neutral
towards religion. In short, Yoder is another illustration that
applying strict scrutiny in free exercise cases will produce a
result inherently friendly towards religion. On the other hand,
not carving out an exception—forcing Yoder to violate the
tenants of his faith—would be hostile towards religion.
In 1983, the Supreme Court’s struggle to interpret the
Establishment Clause turned a new page with Marsh v.
Chambers. 160 In Marsh, the Supreme Court did not apply the
Lemon test and extended a friendly hand towards religion in
holding that Nebraska did not violate the Establishment
Clause by using state funds to pay a chaplain to open its
legislative sessions with prayer.161 In justifying its decision
the Supreme Court relied heavily on the use of chaplains for
public prayer by the First Congress.162 Unfortunately, instead
of relying on the historical understanding of the
Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court carved out an
exception for this practice and did so despite the fact that it is
entirely inconsistent with the spirit and letter of the Lemon
test. Next, in the 1983 case of Mueller v. Allen,163 the
Supreme Court further undermined the Lemon test by
upholding a Minnesota law, which provided a tax deduction
to parents sending their children to religious schools. In
the law by refusing to send his two children, aged 14 and 15, to public
school after they completed the eighth grade. The conviction was affirmed
by the Wisconsin Circuit Court but was reversed by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, which found that the conviction violated the defendant’s
Free Exercise rights under the First Amendment. Id.).
159
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writing for the majority in this case, Justice Rehnquist started
the trend away from Eversonian jurisprudence, as the
Supreme Court’s decision was “flatly at odds with the
fundamental principle that a State may provide no financial
support whatsoever to promote religion.”164
In 1984, the Supreme Court applied the Lemon test in
Lynch v. Donnelly165 and upheld the constitutionality of an
annual Christmas display.166 This decision was friendly
towards religion. In writing for the majority Chief Justice
Burger confirmed that total separation between government
and religion is not possible and that the Constitution
“affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely
tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility towards
any.”167 In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor formulated the
basis for an endorsement test, which states that one runs afoul
of the Establishment Clause if government action amounts to
an endorsement or disapproval of a particular religion.168 This
test is less hostile to religion as it does not appear to mandate
governmental neutrality between religion and irreligion and
therefore is more aligned with the historical understanding of
the clause.
In 1985 the pendulum swung back towards hostility when
the Supreme Court struck down an Alabama law authorizing
schools to set aside one minute each day for voluntary prayer
or meditation in Wallace v. Jaffree.169 Justice Stevens, in
striking down the law, relied heavily on the Lemon test and
“the established principle that the government must pursue a
course of complete neutrality toward religion.”170 This
decision resulted in a strong dissent from Justice Rehnquist
who remained convinced that the “Establishment Clause did
not require government neutrality between religion and
164

Id. at 417 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
166
Id. at 668; Cf., Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (holding
unconstitutional a freestanding nativity display on a county courthouse).
167
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 672-73.
168
Id. at 688 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
169
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 38 (1985).
170
Id. at 60.
165

152

Trends and Issues in Constitutional Law

Vol. 2

irreligion nor did it prohibit the Federal Government from
providing nondiscriminatory aid to religion.”171 Despite the
force of his analysis, the Supreme Court later struck down
programs in which publicly funded teachers offered
supplementary classes in remedial math and reading in
parochial schools.172 In the 1986 case of Goldman v.
Weinberger,173 the Supreme Court continued its trend of
hostility towards religion and signaled a turning of the tide
against the vigorous reading of the Free Exercise Clause
established in Sherbert and Yoder, when it upheld an air force
regulation prohibiting an Orthodox Jewish psychiatrist from
wearing his yarmulke while on duty. In 1988 the Supreme
Court seemingly adopted a per se rule that government land
use decisions need not be curtailed by the impact that they
may have on religious practices.174 These decisions were the
precursors for the hostile revolution, which was soon to
dominate the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise jurisprudence.
This revolution was cemented in the 1990 case of
Employment Division v. Smith.175 In Smith, the Supreme
Court held that the Free Exercise Clause does not require
Oregon to demonstrate a compelling state interest to prohibit
Native American religious use of Peyote through generally
applicable state drug laws.176 Writing for the majority, Justice
Scalia distinguishes Sherbert and limits the application of
strict scrutiny to unemployment cases and hybrid cases.177
The Supreme Court’s decision is clearly hostile to the
religious beliefs of the Native Americans. In dissent, Justice
Blackmun describes such hostility as undermining religious
171
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liberty and as inconsistent with the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act.178
While the pendulum of religious liberty was swinging
towards hostility in the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise
jurisprudence, the pendulum was swinging away from
hostility in the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
In 1992, the Supreme Court held in Lee v. Weisman,179 that
inviting a Rabbi to say prayers at a public middle school
graduation violates the Establishment Clause because it
subtly coerces support or participation in a religious exercise.
For the majority Justice Kennedy stipulated that the
Constitution guarantees a state religion will not be established
and “that government may not coerce anyone to support or
participate in religion or its exercise”180 In advancing this
standard, Kennedy put particular emphasis on the need to
“distinguish between real threat and mere shadow.”181 While
this may not immediately appear friendly towards religion,
Justice Kennedy’s coercion test was actually a step in that
direction Like Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test, the
coercion test is friendly towards religion because it does not
mandate government neutrality towards religion and
irreligion.
In 1993, Congress appeared to express its discontent with
the religious hostility of the Smith decision by voting to pass
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act [hereinafter
“RFRA”]. Through RFRA Congress extended its imprimatur
to the Sherbert decision and sought to mandate the
application of strict scrutiny for all Free Exercise claims.
Notwithstanding this enactment, the pendulum of religious
liberty reached a hostile apex in its arc in 1997 with the
178
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Supreme Court’s decision in City of Boerne v. Flores.182 In
Boerne, the Supreme Court held that Congress had exceeded
its power with RFRA and found RFRA unconstitutional as it
was applied to the states.183 The decision can be seen as
reaching an apex in religious hostility because it firmly
establishes the Smith standard of review as the proper
standard for considering free exercise claims. The Supreme
Court affirmed Smith despite the fact that in doing so it was
directly contradicting the expressed intent of Congress, over
thirty years of free exercise jurisprudence, and the vast array
of historical evidence in support of adopting strict scrutiny.184
Characteristically, the pendulum swung back towards
hostility in 2000 with the Supreme Court’s decision in Santa
Fe Independent School District v. Doe.185 In Santa Fe, the
Supreme Court held that merely giving students the
opportunity to vote on whether to have prayer at public
school football games facially violates the Lemon test.186 In
dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist found this decision “bristled
with hostility” towards religion and “[n]either the holding nor
the tone of the opinion is faithful to the meaning of the
Establishment Clause.”187 Fortunately, the pendulum was not
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rooted as firmly in the arc of hostility for the Establishment
Clause as it is for the Free Exercise Clause.188
This point is further illustrated by the Supreme Court’s
2002 decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,189 which upheld
the Cleveland school voucher program. Writing for the
majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that providing school
vouchers, used primarily to attend sectarian schools at public
expense, does not constitute a violation of the Establishment
Clause.190 This decision is friendly in nature and rests on the
notion that government aid programs may benefit sectarian
beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis.191 Rehnquist went
further by stating that the Constitution does not mandate
governmental neutrality towards religion and irreligion.192
The Supreme Court was given an opportunity to address such
notions in 2004 but did not elect to do so.193
The current location of the pendulum’s arc with regard to
the Establishment Clause is difficult to pinpoint. This is true
by virtue of the inconsistency between the Supreme Court’s
2005 decisions in Van Orden v. Perry194 and McCreary
County v. ACLU.195 In McCreary, the Supreme Court applied
the Lemon test and held by a 5-4 majority that the display of
the Ten Commandments in two Kentucky courthouses
violated the Establishment Clause.196 Justice Stevens, for the
majority, cited Epperson and noted that the “touchstone for
[his] analysis is the principle that the ‘First Amendment
mandates governmental neutrality between religion and
188
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religion, and between religion and nonreligion.’”197 Stevens
goes further and proclaims, “[w]hen the government acts with
the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing
religion, it violates that central Establishment Clause value of
official religious neutrality.”198 Justices Scalia, Rehnquist,
Thomas, and Kennedy were not convinced by this argument.
Historical and philosophical considerations aside, one is hard
pressed to find real guidance from this case in light of the
Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Van Orden.
In Van Orden, the Supreme Court affirmed a U.S. District
Court decision that the location of a Texas Ten
Commandments monument on the Texas state capital
grounds does not violate the Establishment Clause.199 Chief
Justice Rehnquist, in announcing the decision of the Supreme
Court, indicates that the Lemon test is not a controlling test as
“we have not, and do not, adhere to the principle that the
Establishment Clause bars any and all governmental
preference for religion over irreligion.”200 This is clearly
incompatible with the Supreme Court’s earlier holding in
McCreary. Noting as much, Justice Stevens dissents,
remarking again that the “principle that guides my analysis is
neutrality…[because neutrality is] firmly rooted in our
Nation's history and our Constitution's text.”201 Neutrality has
roots in the nation’s history only in the dictum of the Court
and even there it is a weed in the garden of Supreme Court
jurisprudence. Neutrality is not expressly mandated by the
Constitution and history indicates that the Framers did not
view the Religion Clauses as mandating neutrality. Stevens
himself concedes “the requirement that government must
remain neutral between religion and irreligion would have
seemed foreign to some of the Framers.”202 Based on the
religious history of the United States, it would be more
197
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accurate to state that a neutrality ideal would have seemed
foreign to the vast majority of our founding fathers.
From this summary of the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence, it appears that judicial interaction with religion
is inherently friendly or hostile towards religion. Insofar as
this is true, neutrality is a red herring in the Supreme Court’s
analysis. In most instances, therefore, establishing neutrality
as the ideal functions only to distort the Supreme Court’s
analysis. This distortion has greatly magnified the tension
between the Religion Clauses and has been a major
contributing factor in creating instability and incongruence in
the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.
C. Modern Government Practices Illustrate that
Government Interaction with Religion is
Inherently Hostile or Friendly
In view of the swinging pendulum that is the Supreme
Court’s Religion Clauses jurisprudence, it is likely that other
forms of government interaction with religion will also
illustrate inherent hostility or friendliness. A review of
modern government practices supports this conclusion. From
the above review of early aid and involvement with religion,
it is clear that most early government practices were friendly
in nature towards religion.203 Similarly, there are many
modern government practices, such as providing religious
entities with property tax exemptions, which appear to be
friendly towards religion.204
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For instance, the motto “IN GOD WE TRUST” appears
on United States currency and coins. The United States
Department of the Treasury states that during the Civil War it
began to receive many appeals to recognize God on coins.205
The first such recorded appeal came in a November 13, 1861
letter to Secretary of the Treasury Salmon Chase, which was
written by Rev. M.R. Watkinson of Ridleyville,
Pennsylvania.206 Watkinson wrote that recognizing God on
the coins “would make a beautiful coin, to which no possible
citizen could object…[and] would place us openly under the
Divine protection we have personally claimed.”207 Secretary
Chase then wrote a letter to James Pollack, Director of the
mint at Philadelphia informing him that the “trust of our
people in God should be declared on our national coins” and
thereafter instructing him to create “a motto expressing in the
fewest and tersest words possible this national
recognition.”208 Pollack subsequently suggested “OUR
COUNTRY; OUR GOD” or “GOD, OUR TRUST”, which
was later modified by Secretary Chase to read “IN GOD WE
TRUST.”209
This motto first appeared on the 1864 two-cent coin and
later was approved by Congress to appear on all coins.210 The
motto was approved to appear on paper currency beginning in
1957 and eventually was included on the back of all currency
by 1966.211 This formal reliance on divine protection was
cemented in 1956 when the 84th Congress passed a joint
resolution, approved by the President, which established IN
GOD WE TRUST as the official motto of the United
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States.212 The use and adoption of this motto is seemingly
friendly towards religion in that it memorializes, on all forms
of currency, a national reliance on divine protection. This is
particularly friendly to some religions in that currency qua
currency allows this message to be transmitted and perhaps
internalized by a large number of people. On the other hand,
this message can be viewed as biased or hostile towards
religion in that not all religions believe in God. Notably, in its
redeeming capacity, ceremonial deism perpetuates religious
hostility.213 Ceremonial deism prevents the Supreme Court
from subjecting longstanding government practices to fair
scrutiny under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.
Because such practices favor particular religions, ceremonial
deism aids certain religions at the expense of others. Still, in
its reliance on tradition, ceremonial deism does serve to
reinforce the notion that the United States was friendly
towards religion by virtue of its religious heritage.
The Pledge of Allegiance [hereinafter “Pledge”] is
another important example of officially sanctioned
government involvement with religion. The Pledge was
initially proposed in 1892 and stated, “I pledge allegiance to
my Flag and the Republic for which it stands: one Nation
indivisible, with Liberty and Justice for all.”214 In 1942 the
President approved a joint resolution of Congress codifying
as the official Pledge, “I pledge allegiance to the flag of the
United States of America and to the Republic for which it
stands, one Nation indivisible, with liberty and justice for
all.”215 In 1956, Congress amended the Pledge to include the
words “under God” resulting in its current form which states
“I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of
212
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Religion Clauses for certain longstanding government practices involving
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America and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation
under God indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.”216
Further, Justice Stevens points out that the “House Report
that accompanied the legislation observed that, ‘[f]rom the
time of our earliest history our peoples and our institutions
have reflected the traditional concept that our Nation was
founded on a fundamental belief in God.’”217
In keeping with the religion infused national motto, the
Pledge’s religious reference is inherently friendly towards
religions believing in God and hostile towards religions not
believing in God.218 The Pledge is perhaps inherently friendly
to monotheistic religions because it describes our nation as
existing under a God. Inasmuch as God is not a central
component of all religions the phrase “under God” seems to
undermine the tenants of other religions, which can be seen
as hostile towards them.
A brief survey of educational practices and institutions
also reflects that government interaction with religion is
friendly or hostile in nature. This is exemplified by
government financial assistance to religious schools, school
prayer, and the debate surrounding evolution, creationism,
and intelligent design. In terms of financial assistance it is
helpful to consider the decisions produced in Everson,
Lemon, and Agostini v. Felton.219 In Everson, the Supreme
Court issued a decision upholding the constitutionality of
using public funds to provide busing for children to private
religious schools.220 This decision is friendly to religion in
that it provides transportation to religious schools, which is
helpful to students wishing to attend such schools. If the
Supreme Court had struck down this program, however, it
would have had the effect of denying such aid only to
religious schools. Such a denial, rooted exclusively in the fact
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that such schools are religious in nature, would be hostile
towards religion.
Next, in Lemon, the Supreme Court held that public funds
could not be used to subsidize the salaries of teachers in
religious schools. Striking down such programs is hostile to
religion inasmuch as such subsidization is otherwise allowed
for nonreligious private schools.221 Therefore, this decision
has the effect of denying a government benefit to select
schools on the basis of religion only. However, if the
Supreme Court upheld the subsidization scheme it would
have provided significant financial assistance to religious
schools, which is friendly towards religion. Similarly, in
Agostini, the Supreme Court held that public funds might aid
religious institutions provided that such aid is available to
both religious and nonreligious beneficiaries on a
nondiscriminatory basis.222 The Agostini decision has the
effect of allowing religious schools to receive the same aid
that nonreligious schools receive, which is favorable—and
therefore friendly to religion. Denying financial assistance to
religious schools in this context, however, is hostile to
religion.
The debate over school prayer provides another example
that government interaction with religion is either friendly or
hostile in nature. In surveying this debate, it is helpful to
consider the decisions produced in Abington School District
v. Schempp,223 Wallace, and Santa Fe Independent School
District. In Abington, the Supreme Court held that a state law
allowing teachers to read passages from the bible or lead
prayers on a voluntary basis violated the Establishment
Clause.224 This decision is hostile to religion insofar as it
precludes students from learning about religion and
practicing their beliefs in public schools—even on a
voluntary basis. On the other hand, allowing such practices
would be friendly to religion, as it would allow students to
221
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222

162

Trends and Issues in Constitutional Law

Vol. 2

learn about religion and would increase their ability to
practice their religious beliefs. The Supreme Court extended
the hostility encapsulated in Abington, one step further in its
Wallace decision. The Supreme Court held in Wallace that
the Constitution prevents a state from authorizing its schools
to set aside one minute of silence each day for voluntary
prayer or mediation.225 This is hostile in that it prevents
students from having the opportunity for one minute of silent,
self-initiated religious reflection. The Supreme Court
solidified this hostility in the Santa Fe case when it held that
students could not vote on whether to have a prayer at a
school football game.226 If the Supreme Court allowed the
voluntary prayers in Wallace and Santa Fe they would have
provided students with an outlet for religious expression,
which is favorable towards religion.
In addition, the debate surrounding evolution,
creationism, and intelligent design in public school
curriculums has produced similar results. In Epperson v.
Arkansas, 227 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional an
Arkansas law, which sought to prevent evolution from being
taught in public schools. This result is hostile to many
religions as the theory of evolution instructs that all creatures
have evolved, which undermines and contradicts important
tenants of their religious faith. This in turn prompted religious
adherents to push for creationism and intelligent design to be
taught alongside evolution.228 In an effort to secure this result
the Louisiana legislature passed the Creationism Act, which
was struck down by the Supreme Court in Edwards v.
Aguillard.229
In the Edwards case, the Supreme Court held the
Creationism Act was unconstitutional on the basis that it
violated the Lemon test by requiring that creationism be
225
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taught alongside evolution.230 Similarly, in Kitzmiller v.
Dover Area School District, the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania ruled that a local
school district that required public school science classes to
teach intelligent design as an alternative to evolution, violated
the Establishment Clause because intelligent design is
essentially religious in nature.231 The decisions in both
Edwards and Kitzmiller are hostile to religion because they
prevent alternative theories from being required components
in public school curriculums simply by virtue of their
religious implications. On the contrary, if the decisions had
upheld such requirements this would have been friendly to
religion as both creationism and intelligent design are
religious doctrines.
The polarized outcome of government interaction with
religion is particularly evident with regard to moral
considerations. This is true even for moral considerations that
involve government and religion indirectly and is exemplified
by the debates surrounding euthanasia, capital punishment,
abortion, and gay marriage. With regard to euthanasia, in
Washington v. Glucksberg, the Supreme Court upheld a
Washington law proscribing assisted suicide.232 The Supreme
Court held that assisted suicide was not protected by the Due
Process Clause.233 While there are several secular
considerations in support of this decision it is nevertheless
friendly towards religion because it is consistent with the
proscription of suicide in many religions. Notwithstanding
the outcome in this instance, the Supreme Court’s resolution
of decisive moral issues is not always so favorable to
religion. For instance, the Supreme Court has upheld the
constitutionality of capital punishment despite the fact that
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religious authorities almost universally reject it.234 The
Supreme Court has also held that women have a
constitutional right to choose to have an abortion.235
Similarly, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held
that homosexuals have a right to marry under the
Massachusetts State Constitution.236 In all three instances, the
Court’s decisions are hostile to some religions because the
tenants of some religions proscribe such practices. For this
reason, if these issues had been decided the other way around
they would be friendly towards religion.
All of the aforementioned practices and decisions
highlight the fact that government interaction, including
interaction of an indirect nature, is inherently friendly or
hostile towards religion. In each of these situations, many
important governmental and religious interests are at stake
and a myriad of variables must be considered. In making such
considerations it is quite difficult to truly divorce oneself
from personal bias. Further, even if actual impartiality could
be achieved, it is impossible to fully consider and equally
balance all aspects of every variable. Most important
prudence seems to advise against government neutrality
towards religion. Establishing neutrality as the benchmark in
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, therefore, is both
unrealistic and counterproductive.
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LEGAL COERCION AND THE PRUDENCE OF
ADOPTING A NONPREFERENTIALIST APPROACH
TO GOVERNMENT AID AND INVOLVEMENT WITH
RELIGION

Jefferson’s wall metaphor and the associated neutrality
ideal have dominated the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence for
well over forty years. Not all have embraced the two with
open arms though. Over the past twenty years there has been
a growing trend in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in
favor of nonpreferentialism. This section will explain how the
nonpreferentialist approach is consistent with the intent of the
Framers and the express language of the Religion Clauses. In
addition, the views of Alexis de Tocqueville will be
considered relative to the prudence of adopting a
nonpreferentialist approach. Finally, a review will be made of
two important cases that are currently making their way
through the Federal Court system. These two cases are
important as they may present the Supreme Court with an
ideal opportunity to implement nonpreferentialism. The cases
are also important because implementing nonpreferentialism
would abolish two longstanding practices that undermine true
religious liberty.
A. The Nonpreferentialist Approach is Consistent
with the Intent of the Framers and the Express
Language of the Religion Clauses
The First Amendment does not mandate neutrality or
strict separationism. Rather, the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment stipulate, “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof.”237 The Religion Clauses were intended by
the Framers to prevent the national government from favoring
a particular religious sect and to prevent a national church or
religion from being established. The truth of this assertion is
apparent from the debates of the First Congress surrounding
237
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the proposed religion amendment and is reflected throughout
early government practices in the United States. Former
Chief Justice Rehnquist states that from such evidence it
appears “that the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment had acquired a well-accepted meaning: it
forbade establishment of a national religion, and forbade
preference among religious sects or denominations.”238
Similarly, Justice Thomas performed an exhaustive survey of
religion in the revolutionary era and found that “the Framers
saw the Establishment Clause simply as a prohibition on
governmental preferences for some religious faiths over
others.”239 Strong support for this position can be found in
Justice Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution of the
United States. Justice Story’s treatise is particularly relevant
given his prominent role on the Supreme Court during the
post-revolutionary period.240 As Justice Rehnquist observed
in Wallace, Justice Story confirms that there was almost
universal acceptance that religion should “receive
encouragement from the State so far as [such encouragement]
was not incompatible with the private rights of conscience
and the freedom of religious worship.”241
Both the express language of the Religion Clauses and the
Framer’s apparent understanding of them are consistent with
nonpreferentialism. Nonpreferentialism is the view that
government may not prefer one religion to another religion
but may support religion in general. Former Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas have vigorously endorsed this
approach.242 Justice Thomas has advocated for the adoption
238
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of a “legal coercion” standard, which would put
nonpreferentialism back into practice.243 Under the legal
coercion test, the government violates the Establishment
Clause “when it uses legal means to directly coerce religious
beliefs”244 This provides a reliable and manageable way of
enforcing the Establishment Clause, which is consistent with
both the intent of the Framers and the express language of the
Constitution.245 The legal coercion test is also friendly
towards religion because it would allow government to
provide support for religion. Prudence also dictates that the
Supreme Court should adopt a friendly approach in its Free
Exercise jurisprudence. Reinstating Brennan’s strict scrutiny
standard of review would provide a reliable, manageable, and
friendly way of enforcing the Free Exercise Clause, which is
more consistent with the express language of the
Constitution.
Still, many Justices on the Supreme Court have responded
to nonpreferentialism with firm resistance. For instance,
Justice Souter responded to the overwhelming evidence in
support of a nonpreferential approach with his concurrence in
Weisman. In this case, Souter suggests that “[a]lthough
evidence of historical practice can indeed furnish valuable aid
in the interpretation of contemporary language”246 acts such
as inviting a Rabbi to give a speech at a public school
graduation ceremony “prove only that public officials, no
matter when they serve, can turn a blind eye to constitutional
principle.”247
In view of the religious history of the United States and
its associated aid and involvement with religion, this
characterization attempts to establish the exception as the
243
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rule. Souter’s argument is flawed because history shows that
strict separation was the exception and not the rule. The
overwhelming evidence in support of this conclusion is
manifest throughout the nation’s history. Surely, if one turns
a blind eye to our nation’s history, one cannot help but turn a
blind eye to its constitutional principles in the process. This
begs the question as to why neutrality and strict
separationism have enjoyed such prevalence in the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence? Historical consistency, fidelity to the
intent of the Framers, and the express language of the First
Amendment cannot justify this prevalence. The only apparent
justification is that separationist proponents believe it is
advantageous to erect a high and impregnable wall separating
government and religion. This justification fails because the
approach intended by the Framers and adopted in practice by
the government is the more prudent approach.
B. Alexis De Tocqueville and the Prudence of
Adopting the Nonpreferentialist Approach
Adopting nonpreferentialism is prudent because it is in
accord with the demonstrated intent of the founding fathers
and is consistent with the express language of the Religion
Clauses. The prudence of adopting a nonpreferentialist
standard is illustrated by three important observations that
Alexis de Tocqueville made in Democracy in America. By
virtue of these observations it is clear why Tocqueville fears
that the “religious spirit” of America may be in jeopardy.248
This inquiry could not be complete without at least briefly
discussing the views of Tocqueville, as he is perhaps the most
famed proponent of maintaining a religious and political
fellowship in America.
Tocqueville cautions that a new kind of despotism should
be feared in democratic nations such as America.249 In
describing the form of despotism that democratic nations
ought to fear, Tocqueville describes a “mild” despotism that
248
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is rooted in “general apathy, the fruit of individualism.”250
Tocqueville fears that such apathy “does not tyrannize, but it
compresses, enervates, extinguishes, and stupefies a people,
till each nation is reduced to be nothing better than a flock of
timid and industrious animals, of which the government is the
shepherd.”251 In turn, Tocqueville hopes that “[r]eligion may
diminish the threat of mild despotism by reminding citizens
of the seriousness of life outside the busy search for material
well-being in democracies.”252 Nonpreferentialism is prudent,
therefore, because it allows government to support religion
and religion provides vital protection from mild despotism.
Tocqueville describes such despotism as being produced
“in the very shadow of the sovereignty of the people” and as
consisting of “an innumerable crowd of like and equal men
who revolve on themselves without repose, procuring the
small and vulgar pleasure with which they fill their souls.”253
From this it appears that equality, homogeneity, and
materialism are three principle components of mild despotism
and American democracy. Tocqueville indicates that the
combined effect of these components is to soften and weaken
individuals—to prevent exceptional individuals from rising
up from among the crowd.254 Religion is therefore useful as it
“may serve as a reminder of what transcends the mediocrity
of democratic public life, and thus of a greatness not usually
within its scope.”255 Insofar as religion is able to inspire
greatness, nonpreferentialism is prudent as it allows religion
to receive support from government.
Tocqueville also notes, “in the United States religion
is…intermingled with all natural habits and all the sentiments
to which a native country gives birth; that gives it particular
strength.”256 The strength that Tocqueville finds in religion
250
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involves not only its ability to safeguard against the perils of
mild despotism. Rather, Tocqueville is also cognizant of the
role of religion in developing and maintaining the morality,
which is necessary to sustain our form of government.257 In
fact, Tocqueville thinks that there is an “intimate union of the
spirit of religion and the spirit of freedom” such that freedom
“considers religion as the safeguard of mores; and mores as
the guarantee of laws and the pledge of its own duration.”258
Tocqueville was not alone in linking religion and morality
or in finding that the United States is dependent on religious
morality to maintain security and stability. Many prominent
Americans, including many of the founding fathers, shared
such sentiments. For instance, in 1796 during his celebrated
Farewell Address, George Washington proclaimed, “reason
and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality
can prevail in exclusion of religious principle.”259 Similarly,
John Adams stated that our government is not “armed with
power capable of contending with human passions unbridled
by morality and religion” and that in their unbridled form
“[a]vorice, ambition, revenge, or gallantry, would break the
strongest cords of our Constitution as a whale goes through a
net.”260 Perhaps surprisingly, it is well established that
Thomas Jefferson also publicly favored religion over
irreligion.261 Jefferson thought that the only secure basis for
preserving liberty was “a conviction in the minds of the
people that these liberties are of the gift of God.”262
257
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Professor John Koritansky finds that even Thomas Paine,
the quintessential American radical, “is confident that
religions in general, the genus religion, is benign.”263 The
benign nature of religion was also discussed by Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr., who said that “[r]eligion operates not only
on the vertical plane but also on the horizontal...[i]t seeks not
only to integrate men with God but to integrate men with men
and each man with himself.”264 Religion as thus understood is
an important tool in our society. Professor Mansfield remarks
that if “government is to remain limited, individuals must be
able to rule themselves, at least to some extent, and to do this,
religion—which reminds of the importance of our souls—
might seem indispensable.”265 All in all, because morality is a
necessary component for a stable government and because
religion produces morality, it is prudent to adopt
nonpreferentialism as it enables the government to be
supportive of religion.
C. Important Cases on the Horizon
In 2005 Dr. Michael Newdow brought two important
cases in Federal Court. Newdow filed the first case pro per
and as counsel and is again challenging the Constitutionality
of “under God” in the Pledge.266 This case was filed in the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California on
January 3, 2005. District Court Judge Lawrence Karlton ruled
in favor of Newdow and an appeal was filed in the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, which has yet to render its decision.
Newdow brought the second case pro per and is challenging
the Constitutionality of “IN GOD WE TRUST” on United
263

John Koritansky, Thomas Paine: The American Radical, in
HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 75 (Bryan-Paul Frost &
Jeffery Sikkenga eds., Lexington Books 2003).
264
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM (Harper &
Row 1958).
265
MANSFIELD, supra note 136, at 104.
266
As mentioned above, Newdow’s previous attempt at challenging
the pledge failed because the Court decided that he did not have standing
to sue. See, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. V. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 1
(2004).

172

Trends and Issues in Constitutional Law

Vol. 2

States currency. This case was filed in the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of California on November 18, 2005.
The District Court granted a motion to dismiss the case and
an appeal has been filed with the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
In the event that favorable decisions are obtained in the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, it appears quite likely that the
cases will end up before the Supreme Court. This will give
the Supreme Court an excellent opportunity to officially
adopt nonpreferentialism. Perhaps counter-intuitively,
adopting such an approach may actually support Newdow’s
position in both instances. While nonpreferentialism allows
for government support of religion, it requires that in
rendering such support preference not be given to one
religion at the expense of another. Yet including “God” in
both the Pledge and on all United States currency appears to
inherently favor monotheistic religions at the expense of nonmonotheistic religions. Such a result is inconsistent with the
principal tenet of nonpreferentialism. Therefore, if the
Supreme Court were to strictly apply nonpreferentialism, the
explicit references to God on our currency and in the Pledge
would seemingly represent violations of the Establishment
Clause.
Some might seek to assert ceremonial deism as a means
of escaping this conclusion. To adopt nonpreferentialism in
this instance and immediately thereafter employ ceremonial
deism would be an unfortunate and unsatisfying result. If
nonpreferentialism is to maintain its integrity and function
properly, ceremonial deism must not be allowed to prevent
government practices from withstanding the scrutiny of an
objective nonpreferential analysis. Practices that cannot stand
up to such scrutiny should be held unconstitutional regardless
of ceremonial legacy. Because memorialized government
references to “God” prefer religions believing in God they are
unlikely to withstand such scrutiny. Overt references to
“God” on United States currency, in the Pledge, and in the
national motto, favor monotheistic religions at the expense of
other religions. At bottom, true religious liberty must mean
the freedom to practice any religion on an equal basis.
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Favoring one religion over another stifles the freedom to
practice religion on such a basis.
This does not mean, however, that government may not
demonstrate support for religion. Surely, if the currency were
to state “IN RELIGION WE TRUST” it would not violate the
Establishment Cause. Also, a strict application of
nonpreferentialism would allow the government to provide
nondiscriminatory aid to religious institutions.267 This aid will
help to strengthen the “genus religion” and will allow the
government to reap the benefits of its benevolence. For these
reasons, maintaining the religious references in the currency
and Pledge undermines fundamental principles of true
religious liberty.
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In providing such support it will be necessary to define what
beliefs and practices merit formal recognition as “official” religions.
Defining religion as such could become a slippery slope. For this reason
we must navigate the slippery slope at the outset and define religion in
such a manner as to prevent misuse and abuse of the term and to facilitate
protection of the institution.

